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America has an ongoing and devastating opioid epidemic. In 2016, the Department of 
Health and Human Services shared that opioids accounted for more than 42,000 deaths.2 Just one 
year later, more than 47,000 Americans died from an opioid overdose.3 While the opioid crisis is 
certainly not a new phenomenon, the recent barrage of litigations sparked conversation around 
who should be blamed for this massive epidemic and how the blamed parties might be held 
responsible for the consequences of their actions.  
America’s opioid problem is a human-made public health crisis. As with most public 
health issues, more than one solution is needed to combat opioid addiction and alleviate the 
destructive impact opioids can have on individuals and communities. Proposed solutions to 
combat the crisis vary from guidelines for stricter prescribing habits for physicians4 to ending the 
war on drugs and the criminalization of addiction.5  
There may also be a need for ongoing treatment programs, needle exchange programs to 
combat the challenges of addiction,6 research and development into the root causes of addiction, 
                                                 
2 What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-
the-epidemic/index.htm (last updated Sept. 4, 2019).  
3 Nat. Inst. on Drug Abuse, Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis [hereinafter NIDA]. 
4 See Leo Beletsky, Deploying Prescription Drug Monitoring to Address the Overdose Crisis: Ideology Meets 
Reality, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139, 143 (2018) (providing an overview of prescription drug monitoring programs 
and the “current programmatic and legal posture of PDMPs, with focus on law enforcement access, criminal justice 
data integration, and the continued struggle to harmonize the law enforcement-driven design of prescription drug 
monitoring with its supposed public health mandate.”).  
5 See Christine Minhee & Steve Calandrillo, The Cure for America’s Opioid Crisis? End the War on Drugs, 42 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 547 (2019) (arguing that policymakers thrive off the power from fear of addiction and that, 
despite the evidence that a public health approach would be more effective, those in power prefer to blame big 
pharma and continue prohibition on all drugs); see also Jelani Jefferson Exum, From Warfare to Welfare: 
Reconceptualizing Drug Sentencing During the Opioid Crisis, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 941, 942 (2019) (arguing that the 
message around drug addiction is changing, and with this shift comes a need to recast “potential drug offenders as 
community members, rather than enemies.”). 
6 See Ronald O. Valdiserri, Ending HIV and Eliminating Hepatitis C: Unlikely Without Resolving America’s Opioid 
Epidemic, HEALTH AFFS. (May 28, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190522.888602/full/ 
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and how to create less-addictive or, ideally, non-addictive alternatives. To see change, states 
might consider exploring and adopting several of these suggestions through legislative action 
while making significant changes to existing rules and regulations. 
Although many have differing views on the best actions to combat the opioid crisis, 
perhaps the largest barrier to progressive change is obtaining ongoing and consistent funding. 
Despite cost estimates of the opioid crisis being difficult to predict accurately, a comprehensive 
plan will require a sizeable immediate expenditure and a continuing stream of support over at 
least a decade. For example, a comprehensive plan by Senator Elizabeth Warren, based on 
spending data from the HIV/AIDS crisis, proposes $100 billion in federal funding over ten years 
to fund first responders, public health departments, and local communities.7  
While other plans and estimates vary, one thing is clear: change needs to happen, and it 
needs to happen now. Yet, large-scale legislation can be slow to enact, and federal funding can 
take years to secure. Therefore, the current opioid litigation is the best option for an immediate 
source of funding to begin fighting this crisis. This paper begins with a brief overview of the 
history of the opioid epidemic. It will include a discussion on how the opioid problem grew into 
the crisis we know and fear today.8 The paper then moves into a synopsis of the current opioid 
litigation landscape and bellwether trials in Ohio.9  
                                                 
(citing cases of HIV outbreaks in rural areas such as Scott County, Indiana and stating that “the rates of acute 
hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection in the US have more than tripled between 2010 and 2016, largely as a result of 
increased injection drug use associated with our ongoing opioid epidemic.”).  
7 Elizabeth Warren, My Comprehensive Plan to End the Opioid Crisis, Medium: Team WARREN (May 8, 2019),  
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/my-comprehensive-plan-to-end-the-opioid-crisis-9d85deaa3ccb.  
8 See infra Section II.A.  
9 See infra Section II.C.  
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Of course, this is not the first time that large scale litigation has raised such concerns 
about settlement expenditures. In many ways, the legal and public health issues raised in the 
current opioid litigation mirrors the concerns raised in the tobacco litigation of the 1990s.10 What 
ultimately became the largest settlement agreement in United States’ history, the tobacco 
litigation led to a payout of approximately $161.7 billion to settling states since 1998.11 
This paper aims to detail lessons learned from the tobacco master plan settlement and 
identify critical differences between opioids and tobacco that should shape the outcome of a 
potential opioid settlement.12 Finally, this paper concludes with a proposal for structuring a 
settlement plan that includes, at minimum, state-mandated spending requirements for states to 
develop a public-health centered plan to combat the opioid crisis in their communities.13 
II.  Creating a Crisis 
 
A. A Brief History of the Opioid Crisis in the United States 
 
The opioid epidemic in the United States can be traced as far back as the late 19th 
century.14 While opiates have existed for much longer, historians track the first real large-scale 
abuse of opioids to the U.S. Civil War, where many soldiers turned to morphine to relieve 
                                                 
10 See infra Section III.  
11 Actual Annual Tobacco Settlement Payments Received by the States, 1998–2019, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE 
KIDS (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0365.pdf.  
12 Infra Section III.A.  
13 Infra Section IV.A.  
14 Clinton Lawson, Opinion, America’s 150-Year Opioid Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/19/opinion/sunday/opioid-epidemic-history.html. The author 
discusses a newspaper article from the Clarence and Richmond Examiner, which highlighted a story of a young 
woman suffering from opioid addiction. The article from 1878 is titled: “A Beautiful Opium Eater” and discusses 
this young woman’s “morphia mania” which ultimately led to her death. See A Beautiful Opium Eater, CLARENCE & 
RICH. EXAM’R & NEW ENG. ADVERTISER (Mar 23, 1878), 
https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/62080789/5047385.  
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physical and mental pain and suffering.15 Recognizing the emerging crisis of opiate addiction in 
America, states and federal government enacted the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, the 
Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914, and the Heroin Act of 1924 as a legislative attempt to 
regulate the production and distribution of opioids.16 Additionally, in 1908, President Theodore 
Roosevelt appointed Hamilton Wright to be the nation’s first Opium Commissioner.17 These 
regulatory actions signify the first time in U.S. history that the government exhibited a hands-on 
approach to controlling drug consumption.18  
Despite the government’s efforts and oversight, more than a century later, America 
continues to experience devastating losses of life, with each year setting new death toll records.19 
The most recent data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) shows the 
number of deaths from opioid-related overdoses in 2017 is six times higher than in 1999, with an 
average of 130 Americans dying every day.20 The addictive nature of opioids cannot be 
understated as roughly one-quarter of all patients who are prescribed opioids for chronic pain 
misuse them.21 Yet, prescription opioids including OxyContin®, Vicodin®, codeine, and 
morphine are merely a class of opioids alongside synthetic opioids and the illegal drug heroin, all 
of which play a role in the crisis we see today.22 
                                                 
15 Nick Miroff, From Teddy Roosevelt to Trump: How Drug Companies Triggered an Opioid Crisis a Century Ago, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/09/29/the-greatest-drug-
fiends-in-the-world-an-american-opioid-crisis-in-1908/. Morphine addiction in veterans became so common that the 
term “soldiers’ disease” was used to describe the affliction. Id.  
16 Lawson, supra note 14.  
17 Miroff, supra note 15.  
18 See Erik Grant Luna, Our Vietnam: The Prohibition Apocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 483, 486 (1997) (claiming 
that until this century, “drug consumption was largely unfettered by government regulation.”). 
19 Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (last updated Mar. 19, 2020) [hereinafter CDC, 
Understanding the Epidemic]. 
20 Id.  
21 NIDA, supra note 3. 
22 See id.  
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The CDC recognizes the rise in opioid-related overdose deaths in three notable waves.23 
The first wave, beginning in the 1990s, is distinctly linked to an increase in the misuse of legal 
prescription opioids.24 From 1997 to 2002, prescriptions for a newly formulated opioid named 
“OxyContin®” jumped from 670,000 to 6.2 million.25 The zealous prescribing habits by doctors 
during this wave are linked to the shift from “opiophobia” to opioid acceptance after several 
research studies highlighted the failure of medical professionals to treat chronic pain properly 
and the general under-reliance on opioids as a method for such pain treatment.26 
This shift coincided with one notable publication in the 1980s regarding the addictive 
nature of opioids.27 The letter, submitted by Doctor Hershel Jick as a simple eleven-line note to 
the editor in the New England Journal of Medicine (“NEJM”), summarized a graduate student’s 
calculation on the number of patients in the Boston University Medical Center’s database that 
became addicted to narcotics.28 The letter highlighted the finding that of the 11,882 hospitalized 
patients who received narcotics, there were only four instances of “reasonably well documented 
addiction.”29 The publication finished with one line that completely changed the trajectory for 
                                                 
23 CDC, Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 19. 
24 Id.  
25 Mark R. Jones et al., A Brief History of the Opioid Epidemic and Strategies for Pain Medicine, 7 PAIN & 
THERAPY 13, 16 (2018).  
26 Id. at 15.   
27 Id.  
28 Jane Porter & Hershel Jick, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Narcotics, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 123 (1980) 
https://www.nejm.org/doi/10.1056/NEJM198001103020221. This simple one paragraph letter is cited over 680 
times in various medical journals, dental journals, surgical journals, and much more. The New England Journal of 
Medicine also published a letter in 2017 analyzing the various citations to the 1980 letter. See Pamela T.M. Leung, 
et al., A 1980 Letter on the Risk of Opioid Addiction, 376 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2194 (2017) 
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc1700150. This analysis states that, “[o]f the articles that included a 
reference to the 1980 letter, the authors of 439 (72.2%) cited it as evidence that addiction was rare in patients treated 
with opioids.” Id.  
29 Porter & Jick, supra note 28, at 123.   
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opioid use and abuse: “We conclude that despite widespread use of narcotic drugs in hospitals, 
the development of addiction is rare in medical patients with no history of addiction.”30  
This often miscited letter quickly became the tagline for large drug manufacturers, 
including Purdue Pharma. In 1998, amidst an aggressive marketing campaign, Purdue Pharma 
aired a commercial for OxyContin® using the “findings” from the letter to say that the rate of 
addiction among pain patients treated is much less than one percent.31 Neglecting to mention the 
publication’s narrow scope, Purdue’s promotions claimed the risk of addiction to be extremely 
small, urging patients to trust their doctors and even offering “starter coupons” consisting of a 
free, limited-time prescription for OxyContin.32 All the while, Purdue Pharma was also 
vigorously promoting opioids to health care professionals by sending promotional items like 
OxyContin stuffed animals and CDs with songs titled “Get in the Swing with OxyContin.”33  
During this time, campaigns to spread awareness on the benefits of opioids were in full 
force. In 1995, the American Pain Society launched the “pain as the fifth vital sign,” urging 
medical providers to evaluate and treat pain symptoms based on uniform standards.34 Building 
off the American Pain Society campaign momentum, the national non-profit Joint Commission 
compiled pain management standards and distributed them to health care organizations to 
improve their undertreatment of pain.35 Additionally, the Drug Enforcement Agency promised 
                                                 
30 Id.   
31 Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 221 (2009). 
32 Id. at 221–22. These “starter coupons” are reminiscent of the coupons for free cigarettes and other tobacco 
products that were offered prior to their abolition in the Multistate Master Settlement Agreement.  
33 Id. at 222. 




35 Id.  
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that there would be less stringent regulation over opioid prescribers, allowing medical 
professionals to prescribe liberally and often at their own discretion.36 By 2003, opioids were 
used for any type of pain management, and nearly half of all physicians prescribing opioids were 
primary care physicians, despite concerns by some that primary care physicians were not able to 
sufficiently follow up with chronic pain patients due to time constraints.37 
While doctor prescribing habits played a critical role in the consequences of wave one, 
drug manufacturers remained the largest target for lawsuits.38 The legal claims in these lawsuits 
ranged from fraud to negligence to violations of consumer protection statutes, yet the issue at the 
heart of all of these claims echoes the complaint heard today: drug manufacturers play a role in 
opioid addiction.39 Despite best efforts by plaintiffs to blame the creators of these drugs, large 
drug manufacturers, including Purdue Pharma, were mostly successful in defending these claims 
without agreeing to a settlement.40 In many cases, the courts granted summary judgment because 
the plaintiffs failed to make a causal connection between the manufacturers’ aggressive 
campaigns and their resulting injury in the form of addiction.41  
Beginning around 2010, states started to recognize the detrimental effects of opioid 
addiction, and many tightened prescribing regulations for pain clinics.42 These restrictions 
ultimately led to a rise in heroin use, which is the hallmark of the second wave in opioid-related 
                                                 
36 Jones et al., supra note 25, at 16. 
37 Van Zee, supra note 31, at 222.  
38 See Abbe R. Gluck et al., Civil Litigation and the Opioid Epidemic: The Role of Courts in a National Health 
Crisis, 46 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 351 (2018). 
39 Id. at 353.  
40 Id. (“Taking a no-settlement approach [defendants] avoided liability by placing the blame on the individual 
plaintiffs who brought the suit; by arguing that class actions largely ignored the individual medical records of 
patients who used their products[.]”).  
41 Id.; See, e.g., Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 551, 554 (N.D. Tex. 2006). 
42 Abby Goodnough, Opioid Prescriptions Fall After 2010 Peak, C.D.C. Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/health/opioid-painkillers-prescriptions-united-states.html. 
8




deaths.43 Heroin, a street drug made from morphine, quickly became a cheaper and faster 
alternative to prescription opioids for many. From 2010 to 2012, the death rate from heroin 
overdoses doubled while the death rate from prescription opioids decreased ever so slightly.44 
Although heroin existed well before 2010, studies suggest prescription opioid misuse is likely a 
leading factor in the rise of heroin use—approximately 80% of persons who use heroin reported 
that they previously abused opioid prescription painkillers.45  
In 2013, the third wave in opioid-related deaths began with the rise in synthetic opioids 
such as fentanyl.46 At 50–100 times more potent than morphine, the synthetic drug fentanyl is 
primarily used for treating the most severe pain, such as pain caused by cancer.47 From 2013 to 
2016, deaths linked to fentanyl increased from 1,919 deaths to 18,335 deaths, and by late 2016, 
29% of all drug overdose deaths involved fentanyl.48 The most recent study shows synthetic 
opioid deaths are still on the rise, with approximately 31,000 deaths linked to fentanyl in 2018.49 
While fentanyl is a legal prescription drug, as of 2020, most cases of fentanyl overdoses coalesce 
to illegally made fentanyl, which is often a mix of morphine and heroin, creating an even 
deadlier concoction.50  
                                                 
43 CDC, Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 19. 
44 ROSE A. RUDD ET AL., INCREASES IN HEROIN OVERDOSE DEATHS—28 STATES, 2010 TO 2012, 63(39) CDC: 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 849 (Oct. 3, 2014). Note the statistics cited in this report are based off of a 
mortality data from twenty-eight states.  
45 Kim Krisberg, Fatal Heroin Overdoses on the Increase as Use Skyrockets: Health Officials Battling Opiate 
Epidemic, 44 NATION’S HEALTH 1 (2014).  
46 CDC, Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 19. 
47 Fentanyl, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/fentanyl.html (last 
updated Mar. 19, 2020) [hereinafter CDC, Fentanyl].  
48 HOLLY HEDEGAARD ET AL., NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., DRUGS MOST FREQUENTLY INVOLVED IN DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS: UNITED STATES, 2011-2016, 1, 4 (2018).   
49 Id. 
50 CDC, Fentanyl, supra note 47. 
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In 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) declared for the first 
time that the opioid crisis is a national public health emergency.51 With this declaration, HHS 
identified five priorities: (1) “improve access to prevention, treatment, and recovery support 
services”; (2) “target the availability and distribution of overdose-reversing drugs”; (3) 
“strengthen public health data reporting and collection”; (4) “support cutting-edge research on 
addiction and pain”; and (5) “advance the practice of pain management.”52 While critics argue 
that this declaration was no more than a symbolic statement without teeth, the declaration 
arguably helped bring this issue’s enormity into the public sphere.53  
The evolution of today’s modern-day opioid epidemic presents unique challenges for 
policymakers and others involved. The crisis encompasses many complicating factors, and the 
stigma of addiction makes treatment options for those currently affected even more difficult. 
Policymakers, drug manufacturers, medical professionals, and similar groups all have a stake in 
the game, and each has differing opinions on how America should treat and manage opioids. 
However, the opioid epidemic did not happen overnight, and there is no one solution to fix this 
public health problem, nor is there just one party to blame. Yet, there remains a unanimous cry: 
change is needed.  
                                                 
51 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., HHS Acting Secretary Declares Public Health Emergency to 
Address National Opioid Crisis (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/10/26/hhs-acting-secretary-
declares-public-health-emergency-address-national-opioid-crisis.html. 
52 Id.  
53 See Exum, supra note 5 at 942. The author also speaks about the differences between the crack epidemic, which 
largely affected black communities, and compares the crisis response from the crack epidemic to the opioid 
epidemic, which appears to affect white communities at a higher rate. The author brings to light the racial disparities 
in punishment and administrative responses. Id. at 941–42. 
10




B. The Estimated Economic Cost of Opioid Crisis on Communities 
 
No state, county, or city is immune to the devastation opioids inflict on communities. 
While some areas see higher addiction rates based on their population’s composition, all 
communities struggle with figuring out how to fund opioid treatment and addiction.54 The 
Council of Economic Advisers estimates that, in 2015, the total economic cost of the opioid 
crisis was $504 billion, or 2.8% of the GDP.55 85% of this total cost is from fatal overdoses.56   
Opioids inflict a tremendous burden on health care systems and local governments 
responsible for serving their community’s needs. While the effects of opioids are far-reaching, 
some costs, such as state spending on health care, are easier to quantify.57 According to one 
study, in 2013, “[t]he aggregate cost for these prescription opioid-related overdose, abuse, and 
dependence was over $78.5 ($70.1–$87.3) billion,” of which, nearly two-thirds of this total are 
costs related to health care.58 The financial burden of opioids is borne mainly by federal, state, 
and local governments.59 
                                                 
54 See Eric Levitz, Did Americans Turn to Opioids Out of Despair—or Just Because They Were There?, NY 
INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 16, 2018) (stating that “[b]etween 1999 and 2013, the death rate for white, middle-aged, 
working-class Americans increased by 22 percent. This explosion in premature deaths was driven by a surge in 
opioid overdoses, alcohol-related fatalities, and suicides.”).  
55 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE UNDERESTIMATED COST OF THE OPIOID CRISIS (2017). This estimate is six 
times higher than the estimate before, signifying that the crisis is hard to quantify, and best estimates based on data 
may be much higher or lower than the numbers presented in the report.  
56 Sheryl A. Ryan, Calculating the Real Costs of the Opioid Crisis, 141(4) PEDIATRICS (2018), 
https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/141/4/e20174129. 
57 See Elizabeth Weeks & Paula Sanford, Financial Impact of the Opioid Crisis on Local Government: Quantifying 
Costs for Litigation and Policymaking, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1061 (2019) (discussing various economic studies on 
opioids). 
58 Curtis S. Florence et al., The Economic Burden of Prescription Opioid Overdose, Abuse, and Dependence in the 
United States, 2013, 54(10) MED. CARE 901, 906 (2016) (health care costs in this article were estimated by 
identifying and observing Medicare and Medicaid health plan enrollees and comparing abuse or dependence case 
costs versus an “average” patient health care cost to determine excess annual health care costs). 
59 Id.   
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On the other hand, costs such as the burden on the criminal justice system and lost 
productivity are more challenging to quantify. These costs are often abstract and multi-factorial. 
Certainly, looking broadly at how many individuals are in prison based on a drug sentence is 
essential in calculating such costs. However, other factors such as property damage and loss from 
a drug related crime or population and employment data in areas significantly impacted by 
opioids should also be considered.60 These costs are slightly obscure as they are often 
disconnected from the immediate destruction caused by the opioid epidemic. Some have also 
estimated costs by following reports on “criminal justice spending for drug crimes” and 
considering “(1) police protection, (2) legal and adjudication, (3) correctional facilities, and (4) 
property lost due to crimes.” 61It is estimated that criminal justice costs make up approximately 
9.7% of all aggregate opioid spending costs.62 A large portion of these costs, as one might 
expect, are borne by the public.63  
It is also worth noting that, while the opioid crisis affects all communities, opioids may 
disproportionately affect certain groups of people, including people of color and Native 
American communities.64 However, news articles and press releases regarding the impact of the 
epidemic have primarily featured white suburban families and focused on the “whiteness” of the 
                                                 
60 See Howard G. Birnbaum, et al., Societal Costs of Prescription Opioid Abuse, Dependence, and Misuse in the 
United States, 12 FORENSIC PAIN MED. 657, 658–59 (2011) (describing and listing various data sources used to 
estimate societal costs of prescription opioid abuse); see also Florence et al., supra note 58, at 905–06 (discussing 
various methods used to calculate criminal justice costs and lost productivity costs).  
61 Florence et al., supra note 58, at 905.  
62 Id. at 902, 913.  
63 Id. at 908.  
64 See Abdullah Shihipar, Opinion, The Opioid Crisis Isn’t White, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/opinion/opioid-crisis-drug-users.html (“According to statistics collected by 
the Kaiser Family Foundation, black people made up 12 percent of all opioid-related fatal overdose victims in 2017, 
with 5,513 deaths, more than double the number in 2015.”); See also Native American Overdose Deaths Surge Since 
Opioid Epidemic, AP NEWS (Mar. 14, 2018), https://apnews.com/81eb3ae96c2b4f6aae272ec50f0672d2 (“Native 
Americans and Alaska Natives saw a fivefold increase in overdose deaths between 1999 and 2015[.]”).   
12




epidemic.65 This is likely, in part, because the opioid epidemic greatly impacted white 
communities, unlike other drug crises of the past, including the crack epidemic of the 1980s-
1990s.66  
Some also theorize that racial discrimination has played a protective role in black and 
Latino communities, as white patients may be more likely than people of color to be prescribed 
pain medications.67 However, stating that the opioid epidemic is a “white” epidemic grossly 
overlooks the damage and pain Native American and communities of color experience daily.68  
Finally, beyond the economic costs, opioids cause irrevocable destruction in families who 
experience the pain of watching their loved ones suffer from the cycle of addiction or experience 
the heartbreaking loss of a loved one after an opioid-related overdose.69 These societal costs, 
                                                 
65 See Interview by Noel King with Andrew Kolodny, co-director of the Opioid Pol’y Rsch. Collaborative at 
Brandeis, in NPR NEWS (Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/04/562137082/why-is-the-opioid-epidemic-
overwhelmingly-white. Dr. Kolodny compared the opioid epidemic to the crack epidemic and discussed why policy 
makers seem to take more of an interest in the opioid epidemic. Dr. Kolodny states that with the crack epidemic we 
got “a war on drugs and a crackdown on crime. What we’re seeing now is a very different response now that we’ve 
got an addiction epidemic that’s disproportionately white.” Id.  
66 Shihipar, supra note 64.  
67 Interview by Noel King with Andrew Kolodny, supra note 65. Dr. Kolodny discussed his theory about why the 
opioid epidemic has affected white communities. He states:  
[D]octors prescribe narcotics more cautiously to their non-white patients . . . the black patient is 
less likely to be prescribed narcotics, and therefore less likely to wind up becoming addicted to the 
medication. So what I believe is happening is that racial stereotyping is having a protective effect 
on non-white populations.  
68 See, e.g., Matt Irby, The Opioid Crisis in Indian Country: The Impact of Tribal Jurisdiction and the Role of the 
Exhaustion Doctrine, 43 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353 (2018) (discussing the impact of the opioid crisis on Native 
American communities and how the failure of the federal government to protect these communities led the Cherokee 
Nation to file an action in tribal court); Suzette Brewer, Tribes Lead the Battle to Combat a National Opioid Crisis, 
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (May 9, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/articles/tribal-affairs-tribes-lead-the-battle-to-combat-a-
national-opioid-crisis (“As the opioid crisis continues to explode across the country[,] it has ravaged tribal 
communities from Alaska to Maine. Remote and isolated, with limited resources to combat the epidemic’s 
relentless, creeping sprawl, Native Americans and Alaska Natives have been more severely impacted than any other 
demographic in the country.”); Opioids in Indian Country: Beyond the Crisis to Healing the Community: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 115th Cong. 17 (2018) (statement of Michael E. Toedt, MD, Chief Medical 
Officer of the Indian Health Services) (reporting that, in 2015, American Indians and Alaska Natives had the highest 
overdose rates and that it is possible that the numbers may even be higher than reported “because of 
misclassification of race and ethnicity on death certificates[.]”).  
69 See, e.g., Julie Bosman, Inside a Killer Drug Epidemic: A Look at America’s Opioid Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/us/opioid-crisis-epidemic.html?module=inline.  
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including the cost of reducing the quality of a person’s life, or the cost of grieving for a lost 
loved one, are impossible to reasonably quantify.70 While pain, loss, and grieving cannot be 
easily described by numbers, by implementing driven public health focused outcomes, 
communities may be able to prevent this unquantifiable pain from happening to other families. 
The costs that can be estimated can be used as tools for local policymakers when budgeting for a 
public health spending plan. 
C. Opioid Litigation and Bellwether Trials  
 
In 2017, litigators filed hundreds of prescription opioid cases in federal courts all across 
the United States.71 The number significantly increased over the last several years as cities, 
counties, and states brought nearly 2,000 total lawsuits against major pharmaceutical companies, 
retailers, and drug distributors seeking compensation for the costs these communities have 
incurred from opioids. The majority of these cases have been consolidated into a multi-district 
litigation (“MDL”) in the Northern District of Ohio to be presided over by Judge Polster, a 
federal judge in Cleveland.72  
MDL litigation is a unique form of litigation approved under federal law.73 The federal 
statute allows for the transfer and consolidation of proceedings by a judicial panel to a federal 
district court when the action involves “one or more common questions of fact” for the general 
purpose of judicial efficiency.74 While the federal law does not give Judge Polster the authority 
                                                 
70 Florence et al., supra note 58, at 908.  
71 Gluck et al., supra note 38 (describing the range of legal claims brought by hundreds of different plaintiffs).  
72 Jan Hoffman, Groundwork is Laid for Opioids Settlement That Would Touch Every Corner of U.S., N.Y. TIMES 
(June 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/health/opioids-lawsuit-settlement.html. 
73 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018). 
74 Id. § 1407(a).  
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to try the cases, he does have the power to conduct pretrial proceedings, including settlement 
proceedings.75 
The location for the consolidation in this matter was selected, in part, because the Ohio 
region experienced higher-than-average opioid use and abuse in recent years and because the 
area is centrally located to defendants’ headquarters.76 In these cases, the plaintiffs are claiming 
several different legal theories from public nuisance to negligence to civil conspiracy.77 While 
the theories of liability vary slightly, all claims center around the argument that opioid 
manufacturers grossly misrepresented the risks of these drugs, which in turn created or 
contributed to the current opioid crisis with deadly consequences.78 In these cases, the 
defendants span the entire prescription drug chain, from drug manufacturers, distributors, retail 
shops, and physicians.79 In particular, drug manufacturers are beginning to feel the strain from 
the wave of civil lawsuits, as one drug maker, Insys Therapeutics, already filed for bankruptcy, 
with others claiming they are not far behind.80  
                                                 
75 Id.  
76 In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2017); see also HOLLY HEDEGAARD, 
ARIALDI M. MINIÑO, & MARGARET WARNER, DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1997-2017 (2018) 
(noting that the states with the highest rates of death due to drug overdose were West Virginia (57.8 per 100,000), 
Ohio (46.3 per 10,000), Pennsylvania (44.3 per 100,000), the District of Columbia (44.0 per 100,000), and Kentucky 
(37.2 per 100,000)).  
77 Key Questions the Oklahoma Opioid Verdict Didn’t Answer, LAW360 (Aug. 30, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1194408/key-questions-the-oklahoma-opioid-verdict-didn-t-answer; Other 
theories of liability cited thus far include “negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, 
violation of consumer protection statutes, anti-racketeering acts (RICO), Medicaid fraud and false claims acts, [and] 
unjust enrichment.” Id. See also In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 19-3827, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 29054 
(6th Cir. Sept. 25, 2019); In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig. v. Purdue Pharma. L.P., No. 1:18-op-45459, 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101660 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 1, 2019).  
78 See Colin Provost & Paul Nolette, The Opioid Litigation has More Than 2,000 Plaintiffs. Here’s What that Means 
Behind the Scenes, WASH. POST (Sept. 21 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/09/21/opioid-
litigation-has-more-than-plaintiffs-heres-what-that-means-behind-scenes/. 
79 See In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d at 1380–82.  
80 Vanessa Romo, Insys Files for Chapter 11, Days After Landmark Opioid Settlement of $225 Million, NPR NEWS 
(June 10, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/10/731363225/insys-files-for-chapter-11-days-after-landmark-opioid-
settlement-of-225-million.  
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The few cases that remain in state courts set the stage for the potential settlement of the 
MDL. Of these cases, the majority settled before trial, including a settlement between Oklahoma 
and Purdue Pharma for $270 million in March of 2019.81 Of the $270 million, approximately 
$200 million is set to fund a National Center for Addiction Studies and Treatment, while the 
remainder will be distributed to local governments.82  
However, not all lawsuits reached a settlement, including the highly anticipated trial 
against Johnson & Johnson in Oklahoma in August 2019. The complaint by the State of 
Oklahoma against Johnson & Johnson centered on state tort law, claiming the drug company 
created a public nuisance.83 The parties agreed on a few essential items, including that Oklahoma 
has a serious opioid crisis and that opioid prescription sales increased from 2011–2015.84  
Following a seven-week trial where forty-two witnesses and 874 exhibits were presented, 
presiding Judge Balkman ruled that Johnson & Johnson helped fuel the intentionally false and 
dangerous marketing campaigns that caused increased rates of addiction and overdose 
deaths.85Judge Balkman found the defendant’s marketing efforts “were intended to influence the 
prescribing behavior of physicians and, thus, increase Defendants’ profits from opioids.”86 
Further, he found that “[b]y no later than 2001, ‘a significant number of Oklahoma physicians, 
                                                 
81 Sean Murphy & Geoff Mulvihill, Maker of OxyContin Agrees to $270M Settlement in Oklahoma, AP NEWS (Mar. 
26, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/f9db345d659a48bfbff33e6f4c394d0a.  
82 Id.  
83 Complaint at 27, State of Oklahoma v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816 (W.D. Okla. 2017); see also Jan 
Hoffman, Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay $572 Million in Landmark Opioid Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/health/oklahoma-opioids-johnson-and-johnson.html. The theory of liability 
under this case is unique because public nuisance claims are usually brought in cases involving property disputes 
and often center around public health violations such as pollution.  
84 State of Oklahoma v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 WL 9241510, at *1 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Nov. 15, 
2019) [hereinafter “Oklahoma Decision”]. 
85 Id. at *12. 
86 Id. at *4.  
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the healthcare community, law enforcement, medical advisory boards, the [Drug Utilization 
Review] Board’ and others in Oklahoma were ‘being pushed and pushed and marketed [to] and 
misled’ about opioids by Defendants.”87  
The remedy, Judge Balkman concluded, is an order to Johnson & Johnson to pay 
$572,102,028 to the State.88 While the public nuisance theory of liability in this case could look 
somewhat different in other states as public nuisance laws can vary from state to state,89 the 
finding that a drug manufacturer directly contributed to the crisis is a significant step forward. 
 Following these groundbreaking settlement and verdict decisions, settlement discussions 
for the MDL before Judge Polster are picking up speed. In September 2019, Purdue announced a 
potential agreement between the drug manufacturer and twenty-four states.90 The proposed 
settlement agreement called for Purdue to file for bankruptcy and restructure the company into a 
public benefit trust that would continue to sell drugs under certain restrictions.91 Under this 
proposal, Purdue would not need to admit to any wrongdoing.92 The remaining twenty-six states 
are opting out based on the belief that this settlement does not hold the Purdue owners 
accountable.93 Judge Polster’s final settlement must be approved, whose comments suggest he 
would support a public-health-focused spending plan.94  
                                                 
87 Id. at *10.  
88 Id. at *15–21. Judge Balkman lists findings related to costs in this order to conclude that $572 million will 
reasonably cover the costs for opioid enforcement and abatement. Note that the remedy fell short of the plaintiff’s 
original request of $17 billion. See Hoffman, supra note 83. 
89 See Oklahoma Decision at *11 (“Unlike other states’ [public nuisance] statutes that limit nuisances to the 
‘habitual use or the threatened or contemplated habitual use of any place,’ Oklahoma’s statute simply says, 
‘unlawfully doing an act, or omitting to perform a duty.’”).  
90 Faith Khalik et al., Learning the Lessons of Tobacco: A Public Health Approach to the Opioid Settlements, 
HEALTH AFFS.: BLOG (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190925.554104/full/.  
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
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 Judge Polster has also made it clear that an MDL settlement is both expected and 
encouraged. He also spoke about creating change and making a real difference in the opioid 
crisis. In his opening remarks in 2018, Judge Polster announced,  
[W]hat I’m interested in doing is not just moving money around, because this is 
an ongoing crisis. What we’ve got to do is dramatically reduce the number of pills 
that are out there and make sure that the pills that are out there are being used 
properly. . . . [W]e don’t need a lot of briefs and we don’t need trials . . . .95  
 
However, in a year, the litigation has grown as more cities, counties, tribes, hospitals, and non-
profits claim a stake in the battle. 
The large and complex legal battle and lack of settlement agreements led Judge Polster to 
sign off on a first “bellwether” test trial in the Ohio federal courthouse, which took place in 
October 2019.96 The trial was between Cuyahoga and Summit counties and five large drug 
manufacturers. These two counties have been particularly hard-hit by the crisis and currently 
have the nation’s second-highest opioid overdose rate.97 Before the trial was to occur, four of the 
five drug manufacturers and the two Ohio counties agreed upon a multi-million-dollar 
settlement, which may be telling of what is to come for other parties in the MDL. The deal will 
funnel $215 million directly to Cuyahoga and Summit counties from McKesson Corporation, 
Cardinal Health, AmerisourceBergen Corporation, and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries.98  
                                                 
95 George Somi & Ginsey Varghese, Settlement Push for Opiate Litigation, 36 ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 114, 121 
(Sept. 2018) (quoting Transcript of Proceedings at 416, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804, No. 
1:17-CV-2804 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2018). 
96 Khalik et al., supra note 90. 
97 Sara Randazzo, Last-Minute Opioid Deal Could Open Door to Bigger Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/four-drug-companies-reach-last-minute-settlement-in-opioid-litigation-11571658212.  
98 Id.  
18




 In the end, a global settlement agreement will likely go to a national fund to be 
distributed to a single “negotiating class” where the money will be split based on state population 
following approval by state leaders.99 Additionally, communities or towns that have been notably 
more affected by the opioid crisis could see an additional sum of money, as approximately 15% 
of the total settlement is set aside in a separate emergency fund for such use.100 While 
communities would be allowed to opt out if they desired, this is unlikely as the global settlement 
is being developed with many state officials and leaders’ aid.101 
III.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE OPIOID LITIGATION COMPARED TO THE TOBACCO LITIGATION OF 
THE 1990’S 
 
A. Creating the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement: Mistakes to Learn From 
 
In 1998, following a lengthy trial, the four largest tobacco manufacturers agreed to the 
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with forty-six states.102 The participating States agreed to 
give up all future legal claims against these companies and in return, the tobacco manufacturers 
promised to make ongoing annual payments and restrict tobacco marketing and promotional 
campaigns.103 The purpose of the initial litigation was not necessarily to create a settlement 
agreement, but instead to hold cigarette manufacturers accountable for the cost of tobacco on 
public health and to recoup Medicaid losses.104  
                                                 
99 Brian Mann, Architecture for Possible Nationwide Opioid Settlement Unveiled, NPR NEWS (June 14, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/06/14/732661209/architecture-for-landmark-nationwide-opioid-settlement-unveiled.  
100 Id.  
101 Id.  
102 TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW 2, 
https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/MSA-Overview-2018.pdf (last updated Nov. 
2018).  
103 Id. at 3.  
104 Id. at 2.  
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The states’ legal theories against the tobacco manufacturers included statutory claims 
such as violation of consumer protection laws, antitrust claims, and numerous fraud claims, 
among others.105 Yet, instead of testing these theories, the states and tobacco manufacturers 
reached a global settlement, which effectively forced states to drop all legal claims in return for 
the largest civil settlement of $368.5 billion.106 The MSA seemed to be the best solution for 
states to secure the funds to tackle this enormous crisis. To date, the MSA is the largest civil 
litigation settlement in American history.107  
On paper, the MSA could be considered widely successful for it achieved many of the 
goals set out in litigation: restrict tobacco advertising to prevent youth addiction, prohibit 
lobbying against tobacco legislation, create tobacco prevention initiatives, and secure funding to 
improve public health.108 From 1999 to 2020, cigarette manufacturers have paid out 
approximately $168.7 billion under this agreement.109  
Yet, the MSA lacks in one key area: it does not specify how states must use the 
settlement money.110 Instead, the settlement describes how the payments will be made into 
escrow with the ultimate spending decisions left to the state legislatures.111 One MSA report 
shows that from 1998 to 2017, “the Settling States received over $126 billion in payments, 
however, less than 1 percent of these funds were earmarked for state tobacco prevention 
                                                 
105 Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 337 (2002). 
106 Id. at 338.  
107 TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 102, at 1.  
108 Id. at 3–4. 
109 TOBACCO FREE KIDS, ACTUAL ANNUAL TOBACCO SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY THE STATES, 1998-2020 
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0365.pdf. 
110 TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 102, at 5. (This report compares spending habits of big 
tobacco to state funding against big tobacco and finds that “tobacco companies spend $14 to market their products 
for every $1 the states spend to reduce tobacco use.”); see also TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 44–45 
(1998), https://www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/msa-tobacco/MSA.pdf.  
111 TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 102, at 8.  
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programs.”112 Currently, “Not a single state currently funds tobacco prevention programs at the 
level recommend by the [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention].”113 There are few data 
available on what effect the MSA had on tobacco control, making it difficult to measure the 
agreement’s success and hold tobacco manufacturers accountable.114  
To say that the MSA did not impose any obligations on states would be a fallacy. For 
example, under the agreement, settling states agreed to establish a “Antitrust/Consumer 
Protection Tobacco Enforcement Fund” for the tobacco companies to pay into.115 Yet, specific 
ongoing responsibilities of the settling states comprise approximately one page of the eighty-
eight-page agreement. They outline only requirements for the attorney general of settling states 
to attend occasional meetings and manage the funds as they come in.116 The agreement does not 
state how funds must be spent, and while a significant objective of the agreement is “to further 
the Settling States’ policies regarding public health,” the agreement does not outline public 
health approaches for States to take.  
B. The Master Settlement Agreement: Comparing how States Spent Settlement Funds 
 
The MSA resulted in initial payments, annual payments and strategic contribution 
payments to states participating in the settlement agreement.117 The MSA mandated tobacco 
manufacturers to pay upfront payments for five years, followed by yearly payments continuing in 
                                                 
112 Id.   
113 A State-By-State Look at the 1998 Tobacco Settlement 21 Years Later, TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (Jan. 16, 2020), 
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/what-we-do/us/statereport.  
114 Walter J. Jones & Gerard A. Silvestri, The Master Settlement Agreement and Its Impact on Tobacco Use 10 Years 
Later, 137(3) CHEST 692, 692 (2010).  
115 TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 110 at 31-32 
116 Id. at 30–31. 
117 TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 102, at 4.  
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perpetuity.118 Eighteen states, however, chose to securitize MSA funds. In doing so, the states 
receive an upfront lump sum versus annual payments, resulting in secured funding but, overall, 
less money.119 With large sums of settlement coming in and no strings attached to spending, 
many states used funds to pay back state budget deficits or focus on otherwise neglected areas of 
state spending such as infrastructure projects.120  
Because of the lack of uniform spending requirements, states vary widely in how they 
spend MSA funds. To understand the general categories of spending, the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) issued a report on how thirteen different states use their MSA funds. The GAO 
found that the majority of the states allocated only 7% of the funds for the purposes of tobacco 
control while seven states actually allocated 6% of the funds to assist tobacco growers.121 
However, this is not to say that the MSA was in vain. All participating states allocated at least 
some money to tobacco control programs, with as many as ten states dedicating over 10% for 
tobacco control programs and purposes.122  
Unfortunately, many states ebbed and flowed in their commitment to funding tobacco 
prevention and control. The desire to redirect MSA funds for unrelated purposes proved high for 
state policy officials. Even in states that seemed committed to funding tobacco control efforts 
eventually diverted funds for other causes.123  
                                                 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 9.  
120 Id. at 5–6. 
121 GEN. ACCT. OFF., TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: STATES’ USE OF MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PAYMENTS 6–7 
(2001).  
122 Id. at 31. The ten states include Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wyoming.   
123 See Micah L. Berman, Using Opioid Settlement Proceeds for Public Health: Lessons from the Tobacco 
Experience, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1029, 1045–46 (2019) (discussing how states diverted MSA funds when the 
economies hit hard times).  
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1. Minnesota’s Master Settlement Agreement Spending  
 
In 1994, shortly after Mississippi filed a lawsuit against big tobacco, Minnesota became 
the second state to file a lawsuit.124 The Minnesota settlement is particularly unique because the 
state was one of four states that did not sign onto the MSA but instead settled separately with big 
tobacco manufacturers.125 In the end, under the settlement, the tobacco manufacturers agreed to 
pay out more than $6.5 billion to the state and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota.126 
Within one year of the settlement, the Minnesota Legislature created an endowment of 
approximately $20 million per year to prevent tobacco addiction in youth populations. This 
endowment, adequately titled The Minnesota Tobacco Use Prevention and Local Public Health 
Endowment, was trademarked under the name Target Market Organization (TMO).127 Launched 
in 2000, this successful program included youth summit events, targeted marketing and media 
campaigns, sponsored concerts, and numerous school programs.128 At the time, this Tobacco 
Prevention Initiative was Minnesota’s only statewide tobacco prevention program.129  
The Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) took charge of administering tobacco 
prevention programs.130 Initial reports on the program showed that the program was “on track to 
                                                 
124 Cathy Wurzer & Julia Franz, Minnesota’s Landmark Tobacco Settlement is 20 Years Old, MPR NEWS (May 8, 
2018), www.mprnews.org/story/2018/05/08/minnesotas-landmark-tobacco-settlement-is-20-years-old. 
125 Other states included Mississippi, Florida, and Texas. Frank A. Sloan et al., States’ Allocations of Funds from the 
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, 24 HEALTH AFFS. 220, 220 (2005). 
126 Wurzer, supra note 123.  
127 David F. Sly et al., The Outcome Consequences of Defunding the Minnesota Youth Tobacco-Use Prevention 
Program, 41 PREVENTIVE MED. 503, 504 (2005) (discussing the creation of Minnesota’s target market program for 
funding youth tobacco education programs).  
128 TOBACCO PREVENTION AND LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH ENDOWMENT: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 2002 
ACTIVITIES, MINN. DEP’T HEALTH 4 (2002) (programs included open gym and computer time to various schools and 
other events “focused broadly on encouraging positive youth behaviors.”).  
129 Id. at 2.  
130 Id.  
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reach the goal of a 30% reduction in youth tobacco use by 2005.”131 The University of 
Minnesota, along with experts from the MDH and other state agencies, worked together to 
develop measurable outcomes to track youth tobacco use over time.132 Within two years of 
implementing the program, teen tobacco use was down 11%.133  
Despite support by communities, the program was short-lived, and by the spring of 2003, 
the Minnesota Legislature completely phased out the TMO.134 In 2005, researchers assessed the 
consequences of defunding the program by looking at surveyed households at random to see 
whether youth (ages 12–17) were likely to wear gear with a tobacco logo, what their general 
attitudes and beliefs were toward tobacco, and their intent, if any, to smoke.135 The research 
showed that the cutback on funding and discontinuation of the TMO program resulted “in a 
marked increase in the risk of youth smoking” compared to youth smoking rates during the 
implementation of the program.136  
While it is hard to say with certainty how successful the program might have been in 
eliminating tobacco addiction in youths and teens in Minnesota, an examination of trends 
immediately following the end of the TMO, and studies on youth intentions to smoke indicate 
that the discontinuation of the TMO was a mistake. 
                                                 
131 Id. at 5.  
132 Id. at 6–8. (Such outcomes included (1) proportion of youth who use tobacco; (2) initiation of smoking among 
youth; (3) youth self-reported cigarette consumption; (4) youth desire to begin smoking; (5) source of tobacco 
products for youth; (6) proportion of retailers selling tobacco to minors; (7) youth attitudes and beliefs toward 
tobacco use; (8) youth perception of the prevalence of smoking; (9) ability to refuse influences to use tobacco; and 
(10) exposure to secondhand smoke).  
133 Id. at 8.  
134 Sly et al., supra note 126, at 504.  
135 Id. at 507. 
136 Id. at 509.  
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However, Minnesota continues to receive settlement funding which has been used over 
the last twenty years for public health programs, Nice Ride bike sharing programs, and to help 
lessen the state’s deficit.137 Yet, the state has also been active in passing clean air ordinances, 
including the Minnesota Clean Air Act of 2007 which prohibits smoking in public indoor 
spaces.138 Minnesota recently developed the Minnesota Comprehensive Tobacco Control 
Framework 2016–2021 which is primarily funded by the MDH, Clearway Minnesota,139 and 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota—entities that received funding from the settlement.140 
The framework lays out a comprehensive tobacco control program which includes the creation of 
smoke-free policies, education and outreach, aid for current tobacco users, and various economic 
and social strategies.141 
Minnesota, like many other states receiving tobacco settlement money, has not always 
used the funds for the intended purposes, however, legislative updates and the current tobacco 
framework show a dedication by the state to reduce tobacco use. While the State saw a decline in 
tobacco use from the years 2000–2017, the use of e-cigarettes and flavored tobacco products is 
on the rise, and the state is now attempting to find new ways to reduce youth exposure to 
tobacco.142  
                                                 
137 Wurzer, supra note 123.  
138 MINN. STAT. §§ 144.41–.417 (2019). 
139 Clearway Minnesota is a non-profit that was born out of Minnesota’s tobacco settlement agreement. See 
MINNESOTA COMPREHENSIVE TOBACCO CONTROL FRAMEWORK 2016–2021, 10 (2016), 
https://www.health.state.mn.us/communities/tobacco/initiatives/docs/mnframework.pdf.  
140 Id. at 6.   
141 Id. at 9.  
142 MINN. DEP’T HEALTH, TEENS AND TOBACCO IN MINNESOTA: HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE 2017 MINNESOTA YOUTH 
TOBACCO SURVEY 17 (2017).  
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2. North Dakota’s Master Settlement Spending  
 
North Dakota was one of forty-six states signing on to the MSA, but the state chose not to 
allocate or spend MSA funding in the same manner as its neighbors. Instead, North Dakota 
allocated 100% of MSA funds to “water projects and bond payments,” carving out 45% of the 
MSA funds to state infrastructure development projects shortly after the settlement.143 By 2000, 
the state was cited in a CDC report for holding one of the worst ratings for tobacco control 
efforts.144 However, even before the MSA, North Dakota had no existing statewide tobacco 
control programs.145 
 From 1999–2000, policy leaders and the then governor, Ed Schaefer, supported spending 
45% of all funds on clean water and water-related projects.146 While the American Heart and 
Lung Association did not disapprove of spending on clean water, leaders in the organizations 
pushed the state to limit using MSA funds for that purpose, but such spending limits were not 
created.147  
North Dakota was also one of nine states to use MSA funding to supplement its 
educational funds by allocating money for school districts to complete much-needed 
improvements and increase teacher salaries.148 North Dakota did dedicate some of the MSA 
funding to the largely successful Community Health Grant Program, which helped create an 
educational curriculum to teach students about the dangers of smoking.149 From 2001–2005, the 
                                                 
143 GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 120, at 39; Sloan et al., supra note 124, at 224.  
144 Sloan et al., supra note 124, at 224.  
145 Id. at 223–24.  
146 Id. at 224.  
147 Id. 
148 GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 120, at 37–38. The other eight states included Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, New Hampshire, and Ohio.  
149 Sloan et al., supra note 124, at 224. 
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Community Health Grant Program increased funding using MSA dollars from $4.7 million to $6 
million.150 
In 2012, North Dakota passed the Smoke-Free Law, effectively prohibiting smoking in 
all enclosed public areas and areas of employment.151 By 2014, however, North Dakota became 
one of two states to fund tobacco control programs at the minimum levels recommended by the 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention.152 While North Dakota currently remains above the 
national average in cigarette use among both adults and high school students, the state allocates a 
portion of the money from the tobacco settlement toward tobacco prevention.153 Specifically, in 
2019, North Dakota received $53.6 million in revenue from the MSA, though allocated only $5.8 
million to tobacco prevention.154  
Recent efforts are laid out in North Dakota’s Tobacco Prevention and Control Program 
(TPCP).155 Under a partnership with forty-one different organizations, the TPCP created a 
comprehensive state plan which outlines strategies to reduce tobacco use in North Dakota.156 
Such efforts include cessation interventions, outreach and communication focused on prevention 
and creating new social norms, surveillance and evaluation, and implementing CDC best 
practices.157 While the state has experienced budget cuts toward tobacco programs, legislative 
                                                 
150 Id. 
151 N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-10.  
152 TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 102, at 5. 
153 Truth Initiative, Tobacco Use in North Dakota 2019 (June 28, 2019), https://truthinitiative.org/research-
resources/smoking-region/tobacco-use-north-dakota-2019. 
154 Id.  
155 See PRO. DATA ANALYSTS, THE STATE OF TOBACCO CONTROL IN NORTH DAKOTA: 2017–2019 (2019).  
156 Id. at 2.  
157 Id. at 7.  
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efforts to implement a tobacco price increase could bring an influx of funds to the state in the 
future.158 
3. North Carolina’s Master Settlement Agreement Spending  
 
While states were not required to use the funds for any specific purpose, the idea behind 
the MSA was to fund tobacco control and prevention. Many states failed to use MSA spending 
for such public health purposes, but perhaps none failed quite as terribly as North Carolina. 
Using $42 million in MSA funding, North Carolina actually subsidized tobacco farmers with the 
intention of improving farming practices and marketing strategies under the guise of allocation to 
“economic development projects.”159 In total, the state used 75% of the funds for economic 
development and tobacco farming subsidies.160 
Additionally, North Carolina created three institutional disburse MSA funds: (1) the 
Golden LEAF (Long-term Economic Advancement Foundation) to allocate funds to areas of the 
state that are dependent on tobacco farming and production, (2) The Tobacco Trust Fund (TTF) 
“charged with assisting tobacco farmers” among other tobacco-related sales purposes; and (3) the 
Health and Wellness Trust Fund (HWTF), “charged with addressing the health needs of 
vulnerable and underserved populations” among other treatment prevention programs.161 While 
the state did divert approximately 25% of the MSA funds to health and wellness purposes 
through the HWTF, only 21% of the HWTF funding went toward youth tobacco use and 
                                                 
158 Id. at 10.  
159 GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 120, at 27; Jim Estes, Opinion, How the Big Tobacco Deal Went Bad, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/opinion/how-the-big-tobacco-deal-went-bad.html?_r=0.  
160 GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 120, at 35.   
161 Alison Snow Jones et al., Funding of North Carolina Tobacco Control programs Through the Master Settlement 
Agreement, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 36, 37–38 (2007) (noting that the majority of MSA funds went to the Golden 
Leaf Foundation).  
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prevention.162 The remainder went toward other state health initiatives such as obesity 
prevention.163 
North Carolina, along with Kentucky and Virginia, is a large producer of the tobacco 
crop, with this region producing 74% of the United States’ tobacco.164 The MSA directly 
impacted tobacco manufacturers, who subsequently imposed the higher cost burden on tobacco 
farmers and producers. Thus, the purposes behind the subsidy was to prevent job loss from a 
major economic driver of North Carolina’s economy.165 However, because the state developed 
no long-term plans to move away from tobacco production, the MSA, in part, funded the 
continuation of tobacco farming.166 
While funding for these groups continued, the state did eventually spend some funds on 
health programs. In 1999, a year after the MSA, the state contributed 10% of the MSA dollars to 
the American Cancer Society and the American Lung and Heart Associations for the purpose of 
tobacco control.167 All the while, then-current Attorney General (now governor) Mike Easley 
pressed for diversion of funds to other non-tobacco related purposes. For example, in 2003, 
Easley pushed for a $65 million diversion in MSA funds to reduce the state budget deficit.168  
The funding for tobacco prevention purposes continued as the state-sponsored teen-
smoking prevention campaigns.169 Yet, throughout the state’s history, North Carolina lacked a 
                                                 
162 Id. at 39.  
163 Id.  
164 GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 120, at 34. 
165 Id. 
166 See id. at 36–37. 
167 Sloan, supra note 124, at 223. Note that this spending was in conjunction with the spending funding of tobacco 
farming. 
168 Id. at 223. 
169 Id. 
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dedication toward tobacco prevention programs and repercussions for tobacco. From 1991 to 
2019, the State has kept cigarette excess tax at a steady five cents per pack despite the additional 
funds a higher tax could generate.170 Currently, the state’s cigarette tax is at $0.45, nearly a 
quarter of national average of $1.81.171  
By 2017, the state doubled funding for tobacco prevention programs, bringing the total 
spending to $2.1 million.172 While the increase certainly showed a dedication toward reducing 
tobacco use and, especially by youth, the total expenditure represents a small portion of funding 
received.173 In the same year, the state “improved from 47th to 43rd among states in terms of the 
amount of money going toward tobacco-prevention programs.”174  
In 2019, North Carolina received $450.4 million from the tobacco settlement and taxes, 
yet allocated only $2.8 million in state funds to tobacco prevention.175 Therefore, while North 
Carolina is dedicating more funds toward tobacco prevention, progress in tobacco control has 
been slow for the last twenty-one years.  
C. Key Differences and Complicating Factors in the Opioid Litigation 
 
To say the opioid crisis and potential opioid settlement mirrors the problems seen in the 
tobacco litigation is a simplistic understatement. The opioid crisis is caused by years of abhorrent 
marketing techniques by manufacturers, overzealous prescribing by health care professionals, 
criminalization of drug addiction by the federal government, creative and cheaper illegal drug 
mixtures by street dealers, and insufficient funding for treatment programs by states and 
                                                 
170 Id. 
171 Truth Initiative, supra note 152. 
172 Richard Craver, Master Settlement Agreement Remains Flawed Enigma Even After 20 Years, WINSTON-SALEM J. 
(Nov. 25, 2018).  
173 See id.  
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175 Truth Initiative, supra note 152.  
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communities. While opioid distributors may bear the costs of this issue through litigation, 
physicians, hospitals, pharmacies, law enforcement, and local governments also play a critical 
role in this issue. 
Even if distributors could be held solely responsible, the financial differences between 
big tobacco and opioid distributors is so stark that it would be impossible for states to rely on 
continued funding by opioid distributors in the same way they might be able to with the MSA. 
For example, in 2016, “U.S. tobacco sales totaled $94.4 billion, prescription opioids, $8.5 
billion.”176 Thus, it is unlikely that a potential opioid settlement will bring in the same level of 
funding as tobacco did, making even more important for states to allocate closer to 100% of 
funds from the settlement to treat opioid addiction.  
Second, opioids serve an important purpose in the health care system. Opioids are 
approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) as a safe drug to use for prescribed medical 
purposes.177 While non-addictive options would certainly be ideal, opioids are highly effective 
pain care medications that, when taken appropriately, can make a tremendous difference in the 
life of a person suffering from chronic pain or cancer.178 Preventing drug manufacturers from 
creating and distributing opioids is not an option as around fifty million Americans suffer from 
chronic pain, and many rely on prescribed opioids to relieve the burden on their lives.179 The 
health benefit consideration of opioids is a factor that was simply not present in the tobacco 
                                                 
176 Nicolas Terry & Aila Hoss, Opioid Litigation Proceeds: Cautionary Tales from the Tobacco Settlement, HEALTH 
AFFS. (May 23, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180517.992650/full/. 
177 See generally Opioid Medications, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-
drug-class/opioid-medications (last updated July 1, 2019).   
178 See David Leonhardt, Opinion, The Benefit of Opioids, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/opinion/opioids-benefits.html. 
179 JAMES DAHLHAMER ET AL., PREVALENCE OF CHRONIC PAIN AND HIGH-IMPACT CHRONIC PAIN AMONG ADULTS—
UNITED STATES, 2016, 67(36) CDC MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1001, 1002 (Sept. 14, 2018).  
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litigation. While Alternative pain medication could help some with chronic pain, given the 
effectiveness of opioids, the drug must be available until equivalent less-addictive alternatives 
are approved and readily available. 
Unlike the tobacco settlement, which allowed for a possible reduction in damages for 
reducing cigarettes sold in state, drug manufacturers cannot limit prescription medications to 
patients.180 Thus, attempting to copy and paste the MSA’s restrictive guidelines to the opioid 
settlement is simply not feasible. However, like the MSA, the opioid settlement can restrict 
marketing and promoting opioids to health care providers and patients, and fund awareness 
campaigns to try to minimize the use of opioids when an opioid might not be considered 
“medically needed.”181 For example, under the section aptly titled “permanent relief” the MSA 
states: 
No Participating Manufacturer may take any action, directly, or indirectly, to target 
Youth within any Settling State in the advertising, promotion or marketing of 
Tobacco Products, or take any action the primary purpose of which is to initiate, 
maintain, or increase the incidence of Youth smoking within any Settling State.182  
While opioids are regulated under the FDA and thus subject to FDA advertising and promotion 
regulations, the FDA’s role is primarily to ensure any advertisements are truthful.183 Specifically, 
the FDA also requires any promotions and marketing efforts for opioids to be submitted through 
                                                 
180 Terry & Hoss, supra note 175.  
181 The term “medically needed” continues to be debated. While this issue is outside the scope of this paper, it is 
important to note that, as the dramatic changes in opioid prescribing habits during the 1980’s, 1990’s, and early 
2000’s suggest, the concept of “medial necessity” in the context of pain relief is not absolute, and many researchers 
and physicians have differing viewpoints on what should and should not be considered “medically necessary.” See 
e.g., Linda A. Bergthold, Medical Necessity: Do We Need It?, 14 HEALTH AFFS. 180 (1995) (discussing how the 
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182 TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 110, at 14.  
183 See HEALTHY INNOVATION, SAFER FAMILIES: FDA’S 2018 STRATEGIC POLICY ROADMAP (2018), 
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the FDA for review before public distribution.184 Although some drug manufacturers agree to 
voluntarily change marketing policies,185 the opioid settlement, like the MSA, could include 
strict restrictions on the public marketing of opioids.  
There are also important legal differences and considerations as prescription opioids go 
through a heavily regulated health care system. Laws such as the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act186 and the Controlled Substance Act187 regulate and control opioids on a broad 
scale. Unlike tobacco products, an individual of legal age188 cannot walk into a gas station or 
market and purchase opioids. While opioid prescribing habits have changed over the years, a 
prescription is still necessary to access this medication.189 In some ways, this change has sparked 
friction between policymakers who push for aggressive prescription regulations and doctors who 
are tasked with treating pain.190 Therefore, unlike tobacco, the oversight and regulatory scheme 
for opioids will make it difficult to impose strict prohibitions on opioid manufacturers through a 
settlement agreement.  
Finally, the path an opioid can take from prescription to an individual can be difficult to 
track. Addiction to opioids or heroin can start with a straightforward prescription for pain 
treatment. After a patient picks up an opioid prescription from their pharmacist, the path the 
                                                 
184 Van Zee, supra note 31, at 224.  
185 See Alana Semuels, Are Pharmaceutical Companies to Blame for the Opioid Epidemic?, ATLANTIC (June 2, 
2017) (noting that, following a multi-million-dollar settlement, Purdue acted by changing policies and providing a 
better notice of the addictiveness of opioids).  
186 21 U.S.C. ch. 9, § 301 et seq.  
187 21 U.S.C. ch 13, § 801 et seq.  
188 In the United States, the legal age for purchasing tobacco was eighteen years old. However, On December 20, 
2019, the legal age increased to twenty-one under the amended Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See FED. 
DRUG ADMIN, NEWLY SIGNED  LEGISLATION RAISES FEDERAL MINIMUM AGE OF SALE OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS TO 
21, https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/ctp-newsroom/newly-signed-legislation-raises-federal-minimum-age-
sale-tobacco-products-21. 
189 Jane C. Ballantyne, Regulation of Opioid Prescribing, 334(7598) BRIT. MED. J. 811, 812 (2007).  
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opioid can take is often challenging to monitor and control.191 Some may take the drug as 
prescribed and continue to get it refilled appropriately, while others may illegally sell their 
opioid prescription, making it nearly impossible to track and regulate.192 Therefore, while 
imposing requirements on drug manufacturers through a settlement will likely help, the many 
paths an opioid can take makes it difficult to see change through these requirements alone.  
IV.  A PROPOSAL FOR STATES TO DIRECT POTENTIAL SETTLEMENT MONEY TO COMBAT THE 
GROWING OPIOID CRISIS 
 
A. Setting forth State Obligations in Settlement Plan  
 
As the opioid settlement and promises of tens of billions of dollars nears, the mistakes 
made when creating the tobacco litigation should be at the forefront of the settlement drafters’ 
minds. One of the greatest criticisms of the MSA is that the spending obligations outlined in the 
agreement or, more appropriately, the lack thereof, made it nearly impossible to hold states 
accountable for ensuring tobacco control policy was enacted.193  
Recognizing that states may have different immediate needs related to the opioid crisis 
and that the opioid litigation differs in key ways to the tobacco litigation, the impending opioid 
settlement, much like the MSA, should be designed to allow for some flexibility.194 However, a 
                                                 
191 See COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY, COMBATTING THE OPIOID CRISIS: ROLE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL COMMUNITY 3 (2009) (featuring an infographic which details the chain of opioid use and 
abuse).  
192 See id.  
193 Fifteen Years Later, Where Did All the Cigarette Money Go?, NPR (Oct. 13, 2013), 
https://www.npr.org/2013/10/13/233449505/15-years-later-where-did-all-the-cigarette-money-go; see also Jones & 
Silvestri, supra note 114, at 697 (concluding that “the MSA has not resulted in a clear and straightforward 
intensification of state tobacco control efforts . . . .”). 
194 Although the MSA imposed many restrictions on tobacco manufacturers themselves including restrictions on 
advertising and direct targeting of youth and was generally designed to cater to states’ needs, the MSA is arguably 
too flexible. See e.g., TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 102, at 5 (discussing how, “[a]s a result 
of decisions by state legislatures, which are responsible for deciding how the [tobacco] money is spent, state coffers 
lined with this money . . . have not been used for tobacco control and prevention programs.”). 
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comprehensive public-health approach195 and requirements to spend settlement money in 
specific ways should be outlined directly in the settlement agreement, either in its provisions or 
through the use of an appendix.  
The MDL presents a unique opportunity for the court to effectuate change in a massive 
opioid crisis. The tobacco litigation is a prime example of how litigation efforts can fail if 
mandated spending requirements are not imposed directly through a settlement agreement.196 As 
discussed below, a settlement agreement which specifies state-mandated spending requirements 
could raise constitutional law questions. However, judges also have the power to creatively solve 
litigation, fee, and settlement concerns.197  
In this matter, Judge Polster has made it clear that the goal of the litigation is to reduce 
the problem of opioid addiction and abuse, claiming that “[t]he federal court is probably the least 
likely branch of government to try to tackle this, but candidly, the other branches of government, 
federal and state, have punted. So, it’s here.”198 When the government branches tasked with 
developing solutions to a public health crisis fail, another branch must pick up the slack. 
Therefore, to avoid potential settlement money from funding state deficits, the settlement 
agreement should determine how participating states spend the money as they have in the past.  
                                                 
195 For an example on one public health approach to the opioid crisis, see James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Exploring Legal 
and Policy Responses to Opioids: America’s Worst Public Health Emergency, 70 S.C. L. REV. 481, 505 (2019) 
(discussing policy approaches to the opioid crisis and suggesting that “[m]ore aggressive and expansive approaches 
are needed to reduce real-time morbidity and mortality.”).  
196 See supra Section III.A.  
197 See Thomas Sekula, Selective Settlement and the Integrity of the Bellwether Process, 97 TEX. L. REV. 859, 868–
70 (2019) (discussing the concept of “inherent judicial authority” and the various tools which can be employed by 
an MDL judge).  
198 Transcript of Proceedings at 411, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804, No. 1:17-CV-2804 (N.D. 
Ohio Jan. 9, 2018). 
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Arguably, the complex legal battle and diversity of the plaintiffs may make it difficult to 
impose strict spending requirements. However, the settlement agreement should clearly 
determine the specific amount to be distributed to each plaintiff at minimum. The agreement 
should also mandate states use the funds for specific public health purposes based on the states’ 
needs and health infrastructure. Critics of a mandated spending approach believe controlling 
revenue is a legislative function, and to create mandated spending in a settlement agreement 
raises a separation of powers issue.199 However, whether a settlement agreement, in its terms, 
can require funds to be used for specific purposes is up for debate. 
Certainly, allowing a state attorney general to force a state legislature to spend the opioid 
settlement a specific way, or even to allow a state attorney general the authority to sign off on a 
strict spending agreement could raise a state constitutional law issue. An important legislative 
function is the power to tax and spend, and otherwise control public money.200 When courts step 
in to “police” the spending of money, some argue the court upsets the separation of powers.201 
While it is not clear whether including state-mandated spending requirements in a settlement 
would violate a state’s separation of powers doctrine, some argue that the changing and unique 
                                                 
199 Allison Torres Burtka, ’98 Settlement Agreement, AM. MUSEUM OF TORT L. (Apr. 13, 2016), 
https://www.tortmuseum.org/98-tobacco-settlement/. The author discusses an in-depth interview with Joe Rice, lead 
private counsel for the tobacco litigation. When asked whether the settlement could “have gone further to ensure that 
more of the revenue went to tobacco control programs[,] Rice said, ‘If we’d gone much further, we could have had a 
separation of powers disagreement and may have needed legislative approval of the settlement’—which would have 
complicated the process further.” Id.  
200 See generally Power of the Purse, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Origins-
Development/Power-of-the-Purse/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).  
201 See Burtka, supra note 197 (“Some [attorneys general] were actively involved with their governors to ensure that 
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landscape of mass tort litigation and MDL litigation might not raise such a concern if the 
separation of powers doctrine is not read so expansively.202  
Yet, there are options for the settlement agreement to be broad enough to limit the 
attorney general’s power while being narrow enough to effectuate change. One suggestion 
proposes to divide the settlement money so that a portion diverts to a national non-profit 
foundation dedicated to opioid treatment, care, and education.203 The remaining amount is then 
split among the states through a general fund with an outline or proposal plan for state 
legislatures to implement as they see fit for their communities.204 
However, while this proposal is worth exploration, the lack of state requirements would 
arguably lead to a similar outcome, as seen in the MSA. Additionally, the amount going to states 
is likely be far smaller than the MSA. Thus, if the money is split between federal and state 
programs, most participating states might feel it is not worth the time and effort to begin new 
public health programs. Therefore, an effective opioid settlement must impose requirements on 
states, regardless of the possibility of a future separation of powers claim.  
                                                 
202 See e.g., Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited 
Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 410–12 (2011) (discussing how the separation of powers is not practical, and suggesting 
that the doctrine of separation of powers should not preclude courts from aiding other branches when they have 
failed to take action); but see Donald G. Gifford, The Constitutional Bounding of Adjudication: A Fuller(ian) 
Explanation for the Supreme Court’s Mass Tort Jurisprudence, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1109, 1154–56 (2012) (suggesting 
that generalized harms (specifically climate change) should be handled by legislatures and administrative agencies 
and not courts).  
203 See Berman, supra note 122, at 1054–55 (2019) (discussing the MSA’s model which allocates part of the 
settlement money to the Truth Initiative which allowed for widely available treatment options and nationwide 
educational campaigns. The author also discusses Mississippi’s settlement plan model, which directed the settlement 
money directly to a state non-profit entity. However, this model would be extremely difficult to implement and 
enforce in a complex national settlement such as the opioid settlement because it would involve state politics and 
likely much competition from non-profits within each state).  
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At minimum, the settlement plan could outline several general, relevant categories of 
public health actions and mandate that the states choose from the list of action plans based on 
their needs. This approach of having the judiciary tell states how they should spend money has 
been seen in local opioid cases, including the Johnson & Johnson trial in Oklahoma. In the case, 
Judge Balkman made it clear that states must use the money for education and treatment for 
addiction.205 However, imposing requirements on a state following a localized trial is arguably 
easier than imposing requirements through a global settlement agreement. 
Yet, requiring states to spend settlement money for a certain purpose directly through a 
settlement agreement is not unheard of. For example, Wells Fargo recently went under fire after 
allegations surfaced that the bank violated consumer protection laws when it opened millions of 
unauthorized accounts for customers, without their knowledge, to improve their banking 
enrollment numbers.206 In the Wells Fargo Multistate Settlement Agreement under the heading 
“Monetary Payment to the States,” the agreement reads:  
Wells Fargo shall pay an aggregate amount of $575 million related to the Covered 
Conduct to the signatory Attorneys General. Wells Fargo shall pay to each 
signatory Attorney General the specific amount set forth in Appendix A . . . The 
payments to the signatory Attorneys General shall be used for the purposes 
specified and according to the general instructions of each signatory Attorney 
General as set forth in Appendix B.207 
Appendix B provides the procedure for fund allocation and allowable spending purposes. For 
example, the Wells Fargo Settlement Agreement required Arkansas to deposit the settlement 
                                                 
205 See State of Oklahoma v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 WL 4019929, at *20 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 
26, 2019) (concluding that the abatement of the nuisance and costs of services including treatment services, 
treatment resources, public programs, and personnel costs, among other program costs is expected to total 
$572,102,028). 
206 Settlement Agreement, Att’ys Gen.-Wells Fargo, 1–2 (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/Wells-Fargo-Multistate-Settlement-Agreement-12-28-18.pdf (stemming, in part, from 
employees needing to meet unobtainable quotas set by management). 
207 Id. at ¶ 37.  
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funding into the states’ “Consumer Education and Enforcement Fund to be used in accordance 
with Act 763 of 2013, or for other uses permitted by state law.”208 In contrast, Indiana may use 
the settlement payment “for any purpose allowable under Indiana law.”209  
The amounts listed in Appendix A of the Agreement include both payments to the 
Attorneys General for the costs of investigation and are to be used “for the purposes specified 
and according to the general instructions of each Investigating Attorney General . . . .”210 This 
Agreement language suggests that a States’ Attorney General can specify instructions for their 
state to use accordingly. 
 The Wells Fargo Multistate Agreement does a better job of laying out specific state’s 
requirements than the Tobacco MSA. However, even the Wells Fargo Multistate Agreement 
does not impose strict spending requirements on states, and largely leaves it to the state’s 
discretion.211 Yet, the model created by the Wells Fargo Agreement suggests that outlining 
spending requirements is possible, and an agreement can mandate, depending on the state, that a 
state put the funds toward a stated purpose. Of course, it would be challenging to get each state 
to approve of such strict requirements. Such a model could lead to many states dropping out of a 
multistate agreement and instead opt to go to trial or form agreements directly with drug 
manufacturers outside of the MDL.  
Additionally, while the word “mandate” again raises concerns about whether a multistate 
settlement plan could, through its terms, force states to spend money a certain way, there is one 
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simple work-around for this issue. The settlement could directly require the state to pass 
legislation to receive funding, effectively creating an outline to reduce opioid abuse.212 The 
possible action plans laid out in the settlement plan could then serve as a guide for possible 
language to use so that states can begin implementation as soon as possible. If states refuse to 
take legislative action, they could alternatively submit a proposed plan for funding or opt-out of 
the multistate settlement agreement entirely.  
The question of whether a settlement plan, through its terms, can mandate how a state 
spends its settlement money in a certain way is a question that has not been tested. However, the 
opioid settlement provides an opportunity to test the theory through state-mandated spending 
provisions.  
Notably, while the settlement money will provide an immediate boost to states, the most 
important consideration for any program is a dedication to the plan despite ongoing or rising 
costs. A public health-centered opioid program must not have an end date and must have a 
minimum of a five-year funding allowance to get traction. Creating programs to dissolve them 
within two or three years was the downfall for many states when it came to MSA spending. Also, 
the lack of commitment or structure to a plan could mean states risk spending huge down 
payments without a return on investment. Additionally, funding treatment programs can bring 
hope to individuals and communities, and the dissolution of such programs could cause the 
public to lose all trust in public officials.  
                                                 
212 See infra Section IV.B.1. (discussing Minnesota’s legislative efforts to create a plan for spending the opioid 
settlement money).  
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B. Sample Statewide Programs 
 
States involved in the litigation expect a global settlement agreement from the opioid 
bellwether trials to bring a significant sum of money. As argued above, because the opioid crisis 
involves the collaboration of numerous agencies and decision-makers, the settlement must 
impose minimum obligations on the states to effectuate change. States must also establish a 
public health-driven approach to spending the money to see progress in the opioid epidemic and 
to avoid repeating mistakes from the MSA.  
Additionally, if the settlement money is not directly, through its terms, used for public 
health purposes, states must have a fallback plan and should dedicate a significant portion of the 
settlement funds to address the current crisis until certain reduction targets are met. As a result, 
states need an established multi-step spending plan, and the plans must include perspectives from 
doctors, patients, and addicts, alike. Further, states must be transparent in their spending and be 
open to public feedback. As the death toll rises, the consequences of not doing so are too high. 
While not perfect, the following programs and policies provide examples for states to consider 
when implementing new legislations or creating public-health programs to resolve the opioid 
crisis in local communities.  
1. Minnesota’s Opioid Epidemic Response Law  
 
In 2019, Minnesota’s governor Tim Walz signed a landmark piece of legislation, 
effectively securing a source of funding for the state to tackle the opioid epidemic within the 
state’s boundaries.213 H.F. No. 400, now titled “Opiate Epidemic Response” bill, requires drug 
companies to pay $20 million annually through taxes and fees from prescribers, manufacturers, 
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and distributors, which will go into a separate state revenue fund to provide funding to address 
the impact of the opioid crisis.214  
Essentially, the state created this legislation to fund sustainable treatment and opioid 
services statewide.215 While Minnesota’s policy and program efforts require joint collaboration 
across several state agencies, the newly created Opioid Epidemic Response Advisory Council 
oversees the funding.216 The law provides an option to roll back fees for drug manufacturers 
depending on the amount of potential settlement money the state of Minnesota could receive.217 
The new law represents the state’s strong legislative effort to ensure that the potential opioid 
settlement will be funneled through a separate state account and will be spent directly on tackling 
the crisis.  
The Opiate Epidemic Response law is not the first action Minnesota has taken to combat 
the states’ opioid crisis. In 2015, the Minnesota Legislature established the Opioid Prescribing 
Improvement Program (OPIP) to reduce opioid addiction and dependency by Minnesotans.218 
The state recognized that writing a prescription can change a patient’s life forever. As it stands, 
the current proposal states that Minnesota will accomplish a reduction in opioid dependency by  
developing statewide guidelines on appropriate opioid prescribing for acute pain, 
post-acute pain and chronic pain; developing educational resources for providers 
for communicating to patients about pain; and implementing a clinical quality 
improvement program among Minnesota Health Care Program (MHCP)-enrolled 
                                                 
214 Torey Van Oot, Minnesota Launches Landmark Opioid Response Law, STAR TRIB. (July 1, 2019), 
http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-launches-landmark-opioid-response-law/512088472/.  
215 Opioid Epidemic Response Advisory Council, MINN. DEP’T HUM. SERVS., https://mn.gov/dhs/opioids/oer-
advisory-council.jsp (last visited Nov. 11, 2019). 
216 Id.  
217 Id.  
218 MINN. DEP’T HUM. SERVS., LEGIS. REP., OPIOID PRESCRIBING IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (2020).  
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providers whose prescribing behaviors are found to be outside of community 
standards.219 
 To follow through on the OPIP, the Minnesota Department of Human Services 
and the Department of Health created the Opioid Prescribing Work Group (OPWG) to 
formulate prescribing protocols and pain prescribing guidelines.220 
2.  Florida’s Opioid Response Project 
 Since the year 2000, Florida’s opioid overdose rate tripled, causing state officials 
to better understand the need for change in prescribing habits and understand the public 
health implications of the opioid epidemic.221 In 2019, Florida Governor DeSantis 
received $26 million in federal funding for Florida’s State Opioid Response Project 
(SOR)—a program administered through Florida’s Office of Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health to provide comprehensive opioid abuse prevention.222 This program is 
“designed to address the opioid crisis and reduce opioid-related deaths by providing a 
comprehensive array of evidence‐based prevention, medication‐assisted treatment 
(MAT), and recovery support services.”223 
 In the proposal for grant funding, Florida outlined plans for how the state would 
use the funding.224 The plans included hiring a full-time project director to oversee the 
Opioid Response Project, education for middle and high school students in rural areas, 
                                                 
219 Id. at 4.  
220 Id. at 9.  
221 Florida Drug Overdose Surveillance and Epidemiology (FL-DOSE), FLA. DEP’T HEALTH, 
http://www.floridahealth.gov/statistics-and-data/fl-dose/index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2019). 
222 Florida’s State Opioid Response Project, FLA. DEP’T CHILD. & FAMILIES, https://www.myflfamilies.com/service-
programs/samh/opioidSTRP.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).  
223 Id.  
224 See Florida’s Opioid State Targeted Response Project, FLA. DEP’T CHILD. & FAMILIES, 
https://www.myflfamilies.com/service-programs/samh/docs/opioid/Florida%20STR%20Project%20Narrative.pdf.  
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and data analysis and research.225 However, the majority of spending will be used for 
methadone maintenance to help those already addicted to overcome their addiction and to 
reduce opioid-related deaths.226 
Though similar programs focused on opioid prescription management, Florida has 
seen great success in opioid-related mortality. Through targeted efforts on preventing 
excessive prescribing by physicians, Florida witnessed a fifty percent decrease in 
oxycodone overdose deaths.227 Of course, as argued above, opioids do have a public 
health benefit, and prescription management can be a difficult measure of success 
because many individuals suffering from chronic pain need to maintain access to 
prescription opioids.228 Some have argued that Florida’s program, among other 
prescription reduction programs, is too strict, leaving chronic pain and cancer patients 
without necessary pain medications.229 Thus, reducing access to opioids is perhaps not 
always the best solution.  
While the Florida’ State Opioid Response Project does not include language about 
how potential settlement may impact funding, the plan shows, for the first time in many 
years, a progressive effort by the state’s policy makers to combat the opioid crisis that has 
long impacted their state. Therefore, a potential opioid settlement could positively impact 
                                                 
225 Id. at 1.  
226 Id.  
227 State Successes, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/policy/successes.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).  
228 See discussion supra Section III.C. 
229 See Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Can Physicians Prescribe Opioids 
to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 12 (2016) (describing how 
negligent prescribing habits by some physicians have left others nervous to prescribe opioids to treat pain despite the 
fact that “[p]hysicians have an obligation to treat pain, and opioids remain one of the most broadly effective 
medications for many types of pain . . . .”).  
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current efforts by providing the necessary ongoing funding that state opioid programs 
need. Given the states’ recent efforts, it is likely that the state would be supportive of 
strict settlement language that could funnel massive amounts of funding directly to the 
state’s opioid response fund.230  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
As with most public health issues, the current opioid epidemic did not happen overnight. 
What we see today is the progression of a severe health crisis—fueled and funded by drug 
manufacturers and physicians—from a “supposedly harmless” painkiller to a substance known as 
black tar heroin which is an opiate drug made by processing morphine from plants.231 However, 
addiction to the legal painkiller or the illegal street drug, the outcome in many opioid addiction 
cases is death from an overdose.  
Over the last thirty years, the opioid issue has appeared in three waves, from 
overprescribing legal OxyContin® to street manufactured fentanyl overdoses we see today.232 
The shifting landscape of the opioid crisis often came from drastic government responses to the 
issue, such as immediate prohibitions or restrictions on pain medications.233 While there are no 
easy answers or solutions to this crisis, nor is there one party to blame for the widespread 
                                                 
230 Florida’s State Opioid Response Project is funded by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (SAMHSA). See Florida’s Opioid State Targeted Response Project, supra note 222. Because 
SAMHSA is a federal agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the funding would likely 
be directed to Florida’s general fund. However, as argued in Section IV.A, even funding sent directly to a state 
general fund could include mandated spending requirements. Alternatively, Florida policy makers could consider 
enacting legislation effectively creating a separate fund for opioid settlement money.  
231 See DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, HEROIN, HTTPS://WWW.DEA.GOV/TAXONOMY/TERM/441.  
232 Supra Section II.  
233 See supra Section II.A. 
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substance use disorder of opioids in the United States, the current opioid litigation and potential 
settlement creates an opportunity for states to implement necessary policy changes.  
Although large scale litigation in response to public health crises is not a new 
phenomenon, the government’s response has historically neglected to implement strategies to 
combat the crisis. For example, lack of uniformity and requirements in the tobacco MSA of 1998 
resulted in states spending large sums of settlement money with no strings attached.234 The MSA 
presented an opportunity for the states to fund tobacco control efforts, but states mostly failed to 
take advantage of the outcome.  
The current opioid litigation shares many similarities to the tobacco litigation of the 
1990s. First, the legal theories and foundation for the range of claims are based on a nearly 
identical argument: the government is spending billions to address a problem that is caused, in 
part, by the defendants.235 Additionally, the parties for both the tobacco litigation and the 
multistate opioid lawsuit are comprised of similar governmental entities.236Like the MSA, the 
potential opioid settlement could also bring a large influx of secured funding to states and create 
an opportunity for a public health response to the opioid crisis and allow for an immediate surge 
of funding for such programs. 
However, there are crucial differences between the MSA and the opioid litigation. 
Perhaps most importantly, opioids serve a purpose in the health care system. Chronic pain and 
cancer pain are terrible things to endure, and the effects of such pain on a person cannot be 
                                                 
234 See supra Section III.A. 
235 See supra Section II.C; see also supra Section III.A.  
236 Private attorneys also pursue the claims on a contingency fee basis. For a full list of named defendants, see In re 
Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1380–82 (J.P.M.L. 2017). 
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understated. Prescription opioids can help a person suffering from such pain, and thus, should 
not be eliminated from a physician’s arsenal of possible prescription medications for patients.237  
While alternative pain medications and awareness campaigns could help prevent 
addiction in new and existing patients, the reality is that opioids are here to stay. Therefore, the 
best option is direct spending toward a multifaceted public health approach to help those already 
addicted, prevent future opioid addiction, and to eliminate the stigma surrounding addiction, 
among other needs.  
The MSA set the groundwork for how a multistate settlement effort could be created. 
Yet, mistakes were certainly made. Because the MSA did not mandate state spending, states did 
not spend the settlement primarily on tobacco control efforts. This opioid litigation presents a 
chance to learn from those mistakes. To break the cycle of opioid addiction and truly create 
change in communities, states must do better this time around. 
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